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Cyberspace: Malevolent Actors,
Criminal Opportunities, and
Strategic Competition Conference
The “Cyberspace: Malevolent Actors, Criminal Opportunities, and Strategic
Competition” conference was held on November 1-2, 2012, in Pittsburgh, PA. The
conference was sponsored by the Matthew B. Ridgway Center for International
Security Studies, University of Pittsburgh, and the Strategic Studies Institute of
the U.S. Army War College, and co-sponsored by the National Cyber Forensic
Training Alliance (NCFTA) and Indiana University of Pennsylvania (IUP). Sixty
participants from academia, government, military, law enforcement, and private
industry attended the multidisciplinary and policy-relevant gathering. Major
themes identified in the agenda included:
      •    The spectrum of cyber threats that the United States increasingly must
confront;
      •    The ways in which cyberspace is exploited by criminal and terrorist
organizations; and,
      •    The evolution of cyberspace as an arena for strategic competition among the
great powers.
 
      The conference was composed of a welcome and introduction, three major
panels, and a concluding round table on policy recommendations and responses.
Acting conference chairs were Phil Williams, University of Pittsburgh; and John R.
Deni, U.S. Army War College. Leading scholars, practitioners, and researchers who
delivered presentations included Anna Aquilina, Serious Organised Crime Agency,
UK; Stephen Blank, U.S. Army War College; Dave Bobrow, University of
Pittsburgh; Nazli Choucri, MIT; William Claycomb, CERT, Carnegie Mellon
University; Aaron Hackworth, Dell; Michael Kenney, University of Pittsburgh;
Daniel Larkin, NCFTA; Martin Libicki, RAND; Michael McKeown, FBI; Isaac
Porche, RAND; Harvey Rishikof, Drexel University; Jon Ruttencutter, DHS;
Timothy Shimeall, CERT; Timothy Thomas, Foreign Military Studies Office; and
William Waddell, U.S. Army War College.
 
      Specific topics of interest included: the new realities of 21st century cyber
politics and implications for the U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the U.S.
interagency; internet futures; an internet of devices including three-dimensional
printers (replicators); the legal dimensions of cyberspace; Chinese system
sabotage; the use of botnets by Eastern European organized crime organizations;
coordinated Russian and organized crime cyber operations; the indications and
warnings that cybercrime has shifted to cyber conflict; cyber war by proxies and
activists; deterrence in cyberspace, cyber defense, and public-private initiatives to
mitigate and respond to cyber threats.
 
      Major policy recommendations discussed during the course of the conference
and summarized during the concluding round table included:
      •    Develop “rules of the road” for cyberspace, especially with countries such as
China, to increase transparency and aid in avoiding miscalculations.
      •    Promote cooperative security efforts—including DoD-implemented security
cooperation activities—in cyberspace between the United States and other
governments.
      •    Maintain and grow public-private initiatives such as the NCFTA, to better
integrate policies, procedures, and information sharing between and among
government agencies such as DoD, the FBI, and private industry and
academia.
      •    Promote university programs that seek to bridge the gaps between the
technical, policy, practitioner, and legal worlds when it comes to cyber
security—too often these worlds do not coordinate well with one another.
      •    Better define what we mean by the term cyberspace—for example, to clarify
its functionality as only transmitting data or as something more
encompassing in regards to dimensionality (e.g., virtual worlds).
      •    Reconsider the use of military models for characterizing and understanding
cyberspace issues, perhaps by exploring public health (epidemiological)
models for international coordination purposes.
      •    Develop standardized corporate “playbooks” concerning procedures and
processes for responding to cyberspace based intrusions and criminal
incidents.
      •    Review computer security lessons learned from private industry for their
potential application to governmental and military environments.
      •    Have the Government Accountability Office (GAO) conduct a study on what
is and is not working with stakeholder computer systems.
      •    Determine strategies to help the U.S. Congress better create informed
national cyberspace security legislation to protect the private sector
specifically, and U.S. national security more broadly.
 
      The full conference agenda can be accessed via the Matthew B. Ridgway Center
website at www.ridgway.pitt.edu. A Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army
War College Press, U.S. Army War College, edited volume composed of writings
from this conference will be published in the future. It can be obtained upon
publication at the Strategic Studies Institute website at
www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil.
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